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Abstract 
Human Rights Accountability is a property of the relationship between rulers and citi-
zens. When it exists, it prevents violations of Human Rights by enabling citizens to in-
fluence decision-making. The concept needs clarification in order to reach its full poten-
tial as a tool for planning and analysis. Misunderstanding can have dangerous conse-
quences in the failure to prevent political violence, electoral fraud and more. 
Through a Grounded Theory Analysis of efforts to strengthen accountability mecha-
nisms after the 2008 Post-Election Violence in Kenya and their positive and negative 
effects on the electoral situation in 2013, a new theoretical framework is developed. It 
concludes that achieving Human Rights Accountability depends on claims being active-
ly made,  being supported with enough power, by channeling the struggle to achieve 
right-objects through the processes of accountability, with enough efficiency that they 
actually make a difference in the power relationship. 
Right-objects should not be delivered by reversing the accountability relationship by 
suppressing other rights. Then the fight for Human Rights Accountability is not over 
and the struggle for justice must continue. 
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Crowd sourcing, Social Accountability, Political Accountability, Responsibility to pre-
vent, Grounded theory  
 
 
  
Abstrakt 
Human Rights Accountability är en egenskap i relationen mellan styrande och 
medborgare. När egenskapen existerar förhindrar den människorättskränkningar genom 
att medborgarna får inflytande över beslutfattande. Begreppet behöver klargöras för att 
nå sitt fulla potential som verktyg för planering och analys eftersom missförståelse kan 
ha farliga konsekvenser i misslyckandet att förebygga politiskt våld, valfusk mm.  
Genom en grounded theory analys av insatser för stärkande av ansvarsmekanismer 
efter valvåldet i Kenya 2008 och dess positiva och negativa effekter på valsituationen 
2013 skapas ett nytt teoretiskt ramverk. Slutsatsen är att Human Rights Accountabilty 
endast kan uppnås med tillräcklig makt bakom hotet av sanktion, genom att kampen för 
uppnående av rättighetsobjekten måste kanaliseras genom processerna för 
ansvarsutkrävande och att dessa är så effektiva att de gör en verklig skillnad i 
maktrelation.  
Ett rättighetsobjekt bör inte uppnås på bekostnad av andra rättigheter. Om det uppnås 
genom att medborgarna hålls ansvariga för dess uppfyllande i en omvänd 
ansvarsmekanism blir resultatet ytligt och kortsiktigt. Då är kampen för Human Rights 
Accountabilty inte över och man måste fortsätta kämpa för rättvisa. 
 
Nyckelord: Human Rights Accountability, Enforceability, Answerability, ICT4D, 
Crowd sourcing, Social Accountability, Political Accountability, Responsibility to pre-
vent, Grounded theory  
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1 Introduction 
In the absence of accountability 
The system of Human Rights can be seen as a system of accountability mechanisms. By 
assigning responsibility, creating opportunity for people to make demands, monitoring 
and providing sanctions, the aim is to help citizens hold their rulers to account to make 
policies that are beneficial to the people.
1
 
Perhaps the value of Human Rights Accountabilityis best understood by seeing what 
happens in its absence. Without mechanisms for demanding accountability, the poor or 
disempowered cannot claim their entitlements; they can only stand back and watch as 
their countries are mismanaged while power and money make the rulers immune to re-
strictions on how they should act and behave. The ones who wield power can adapt pol-
icies to suit their own interests while not working in the benefits of the people. Re-
sources intended for legitimate ends will be used for private gains of the rulers while the 
substandard polices that come from such corrupt decision-making worsens the poverty 
and disempowerment of the people. 
All though most of the world’s countries call themselves democracies and hold elec-
tions, these elections often fall short of their real purpose. Ideally, the election process 
should be a mechanism to put the power of the rule of a country in the hands of the citi-
zen if the people have the power to sanction the politicians for misconduct by deposing 
them through voting them off. Sadly, many elections fail to live up to the promise of 
being a way for the people to express their needs and wishes. They are lined with viola-
tions of Human Rights, violence, vote buying and other corrupt acts. In several dark 
chapters of the history of the world, elections are affected by politicians who manipulate 
sentiments of ethnicity to create violence in order to cement their rule or gain more 
power. 
Violent elections 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1 ICHRP Integrating Human Rights in the Anti-Corruption Agenda, Challenges, Possibilities and 
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 One such dark chapter was the election that was held in Kenya in the last days of 
December 2007. Despite being predicted to be a peaceful and fair election, the follow-
ing months became the most violent period in Kenya’s history after independence. The 
period is referred to as ThePost-Election Violence, (PEV). More specifically this refers 
to a period of acts of ethic and political violence, forced evictions of nearly 600 000 
people, arsons and the murders of at least 1300 people that went on between the con-
tested nightly swearing in of the president until a peace agreement was reached with the 
help of a team of international negotiators.
2
Until then, the violence was on the verge of 
becoming genocidal, but was halted before it reached such extent. It is commonly being 
labeled Crimes against Humanity, by for example The Kenya Human Rights Commis-
sion. They motivate the use of the term “because of including conduct such as the mul-
tiple commissions [by politicians]of acts of inhumanity against civilian populations, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of an organizational policy to commit such attacks in the 
theatres of violence.”3 
Initiatives for Change 
Faced with the horror of the Post-Election Violence and the notion that there was a 
very high risk of the same situation reoccurring the next time Kenya would go to the 
ballots, many different actors, who were interested in making future elections free from 
Human Rights violations, started to work on changing the conditions for elections. Ac-
tive efforts were initiated from all corners of Kenyan society, from government officials 
and political and religious leaders to political parties, civil society organizations, to em-
brace a discourse of peace and reject violence. 
In the years between the two elections, several initiatives were made with the goal of 
changing the conditions for accountability in Kenya. Different initiatives interpreted and 
used the various aspects of accountability to try to bring about the change that they de-
sired in securing the rights of the people. They had different ideas of what it would take 
to overpower the powerful to make them respect and protect the rights of the ones over 
whom they wield power. The efficiency of their efforts was going to be put to the test 
the next time Kenyans would go to the ballots. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
2Cheeseman, N. The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction, University of Oxford, Journal of East-
ern African Studies Vol. 2, No. 2, 166_184, July 2008 p. 166 -184 
3 Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence,CIPEVReport of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Post-Election Violence s 303 
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Moment of Truth  
Fast-forward to the 2013 election. If the measure of success for the election is that the 
elections transpired peacefully, then this election was a major success. Only very few 
instances of violence occurred. This time around, electoral results were being contested 
through the courts and not through violence in the streets. 
On a more somber note, the election was tainted by irregularities and incompetence. 
The system of counting votes was malfunctioning and votes had to be counted manual-
ly, while widespread rumors went around saying that the tallying technology had been 
hacked. By the narrowest margin possible, a run-off election was averted, 50 percent 
was needed to secure the election in the first round, and Kenyatta got 50.07 %, winning 
by 8000 votes out of 12.4 million.Many people were unhappy with the way the election 
had been handled and the defeated candidate Odinga unsuccessfully took his case to the 
Supreme Court. 
This essay suggests that the key to preventing Human Rights violations can be found 
in creating strong mechanisms for Human Rights Accountability. It shows that account-
ability mechanisms can change the dynamics between citizen and ruler that make it pos-
sible for marginalized to affect the decision-making of the ruler, but only if a certain set 
of ingredients are present. 
If properly understood, these mechanisms can be powerful tools both for planning 
actions and for analyzing situations, but they need clarification for its full potential to be 
realized and utilized. If they are misunderstood, the analytical fallacies and conceptual 
misunderstandings can have grave consequences in the failures to achieve sustainable 
peace and democracy. 
By investigating how a selection of four efforts intended to create accountability in 
Kenya operationalized the concept and examining the effects of these initiatives this 
study hopes to bring valuable lessons about the concept of Human Rights accountability 
for its full potential to be reached. The International Criminal Courts involvement in the 
prosecution of individuals for Crimes against Humanity of the 2008 Election Violence 
period is contrasted with the “Peace movement”, together with the conditional changes 
drawn from the new Kenyan constitution of 2010, and ICT crowd-sourcing election 
monitoring platforms. These will be further defined in chapter 4. 
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1.1 Research problem  
The current use of the broad term accountability is confusing because it is very broad 
and has many divergent uses. It is being used in many fields such as law, politics, per-
sonal ethics, accounting, business management etc. Each field has several understand-
ings and holds different meanings, and each adds and subtracts characteristics to the 
terms. When the meanings and characteristics that each field gives the concept are 
mixed up, the result is that the possible benefits that can come from using accountability 
as a relevant tool for analysis and policymaking are no longer communicated. Taking to 
account that the discourse on Human Rights itself is a multidisciplinary field that uses a 
mix of law, ethics, theology and political philosophy, the mixing and borrowing of theo-
ries and intellectual baggage gets even more complicated. 
Various unclear understandings of the concept could lead to different interpretations 
that can directly harmful for those who want to take action. The issue is very serious, 
given the importance of the mechanisms. If they are the key to preventing and conquer-
ing oppression, inequality and political violence, then the consequences of misunder-
standing its mechanisms is the failure of the struggle against these evils. 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this essay is to bring clarity to the concept of Human Rights Accounta-
bility, and to find out which ways the concept should properly be used in the Human 
Rightsfield to make it an effective tool for the prevention of violations. Instead of cen-
tering the research on questions that are decided in the beginning of the essay, the meth-
odology chosen for this thesisallows the questions to evolve throughout the study. By 
including specific tangible contributions that have the aim of increasing Human Rights 
accountability, and placing them inside a theoretical framework for accountability, les-
sons are learned of both the efficiency of the methods and on the dynamics of the con-
cept.  
For the study to be true to the question of finding a better understanding of the con-
cept and its operationalization, it would be wrong to answer the problem solely by 
blending different researcher’s perspectives. It would run the risk of adding to the con-
fusion of the subtypes of accountability. Therefore, the important aspects of the ac-
countability concept will be further developed through building a theoretical framework 
based on data from a case study. The case study will be the prevention efforts of 
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strengthening conditions for accountability between the 2007/2008 and 2013 elections 
in Kenya.  
The Kenya Post Election Violence prevention case provides the essay with a current 
case where several strategies to avoid Human Rights violations were employed with a 
very specific deadline. Whatever needed to be done had to be done before a certain date 
when next election would arrive. The knowledge that there was a day were the strate-
gies used over the past five years would be tested is an interesting feature that is rare in 
the field of Human Rights, where results are often less dichotomous and usually allow a 
longer time frame for expected results to take place. 
1.3 Limitations 
 
The report aims to further the understanding of the effects and effectiveness of the con-
cept of accountability initiatives. It uses the Kenyan examples as an environment from 
which insights can be drawn, not as the object of the study. The object of study is the 
inner and outer functioning of Human Rights Accountability.  
It does not intend to make judgment on whether it was “a price worth paying” when 
the initiatives sacrifice democracy when pursuing peace or when they have sacrificed 
peace when pursuing justice.Neither will it speculate about which of the four initiatives 
had the highest impact on the absence of violence. The issues of contribution and attrib-
utions are far more complicated for the format of the study. It is presumed that the initi-
atives all aimed to contribute to the outcome, but does not aspire to make any verdict on 
whether they actually did. 
Focus lies primarily on the time in the period between the elections and deliberately 
avoids details about the election violence period. For more details on this interesting 
period, please refer to this root cause analysis of the situation.
4
 
Since the study is based on a variety of written material created for other purposes it 
cannot claim to find out the actual intentions behind the initiatives, it has assumed that 
the theories of change behind the initiatives can be found in the rationale behind the 
design of the campaigns.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
4 For further reference see Felix, M. Att lära av från misstagenfrån Kenyas Post Election Violence– 
förmodade orsaker och ansvar för förebyggande. Lund Human Rights Studies, 2012 
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2 Method 
Through the combined use of ameliorative conceptual analysis and grounded theory of a 
case study, a fresh theoretical understanding can emerge from the data. The two meth-
ods complement each other well as they both strive to create an improved understanding 
of the concept or phenomena that they are exploring.  
The first part of the report is a conceptual analysis with an ameliorative aim. It uses a 
method for conceptual analysis that was drawn from Sally Haslangers article“What are 
we talking about? The semantics and politics of socialkinds”. In the article,Haslanger 
suggests categories for how research questions on concepts can be answered, depending 
on which methodological assumptions the researcher makes. With this approach to con-
ceptual analysis, the researcher tries to find the point in using the concept, how should it 
fit in society. The approach gives a progressive function and seeks to find a use for the 
term where it changes the world for the better.
5
 
With an ameliorative approach, suggestions of improvements can be made for in the 
use and understanding of Accountability, as it should be interpreted when combined 
with a Human Rights perspective.Given that the issue to be dealt with in the essay is 
that of insufficient knowledge of how a term should best be used, the essay will not 
dwell extensively on other methods of conceptual analysis that describe the current use 
or the current idea. These are assumed less than ideal and therefore more part of the 
problem of the conceptual understanding than the analytical solution.  
Here, the goal is to construct a theory that is true to finding out as much about the ac-
tual studied phenomena, without putting excessive emphasis on maintaining a preset 
setting for the study.
6
 Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the case study will be 
merged into the conceptual analysis. The reason for choosing to use the method 
Grounded theory, is that it does not start with preconceived ideas to be confirmed by 
studying a situation. It allows the researcher to work with an open mind while systemat-
ically and simultaneously collecting, coding and analyzing qualitative data to build a 
                                                                                                                                               
 
5 Haslanger, p. What Are We Talking About? The Semantics and Politics of Social KindsHypatia,2005, 
vol. 20, no. 4, p. 10-12. 2005 p. 10-12 
6 Charmaz, K. Constructing Grounded Theory- a practical guide through qualitative analysis London: 
SAGE , 2006, p. 22 
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theoretical perspective that is well anchored in the studied data. The original method 
was first introduced by Glaser &Strauss in 1967 in their bookDiscovering Grounded 
Theory
7
. In their perspective, the method allows the researcher to discover a theory that 
emerges from the data, separately from the observer. However, this essay will assume 
the interpretation and guidance from Kathy Charmaz in her book Constructing Ground-
ed theory, in which the theory is seen as being constructed through the interpretation of 
the researcher.
8
 
According to Charmaz, the interests of the researcher should serve as a guide for the 
initial points for departure when starting to select data and interpreting it. The research 
question formulates itself after adapting to the findings in the gathered qualitative data 
through the research process. The method acknowledges and embraces that research 
cannot be separate from the researcher’s interpretation; instead, it highlights the re-
searcher’s personal and professional impact in choosing which data to collect, how it 
should be interpreted and analyzed. 
In the array of tools available within the method, the study will use simultaneous 
analysis and data collection, memo writing and line by line coding. By applying the 
grounded theory methodology to the case setting, a wide variety of sources could be 
scoped for valuable data. The use of this method made it possible to adjust the data col-
lection throughout the process as the theory develops and the data that should be con-
sidered valuable, changes. The flexibility makes it possible to stay closely aligned with 
the findings and letting the findings lead the researchprocess forward. The process of 
selecting which data that should deemed as noteworthy derived from my own first hand 
observations of the 2008 Post Election Violence, as well as previous research that I have 
undertaken on the supposed causality mechanisms and the preventative measures under-
taken by the Kenyan government.
9
 
Four striking and interesting initiatives were chosen to be analyzed in the Case 
Study.What they have in common is that they aim to strengthen chosen areas in the dy-
namics of accountability to achieve higher accountability for securing the rights of the 
Kenyan people to be protected from political violence. In other words, for these strate-
                                                                                                                                               
 
7 Ibid, p. 7 
8 Ibid, p.10 
9 For further reference see Felix, M. Att lära av från misstagenfrån Kenyas Post Election Violence– 
förmodade orsaker och ansvar för förebyggande. Lund Human Rights Studies 
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gies, the accountability for human rights serves both as the outcome of their work as 
well as the tool that they use according to how they assume that change can be creat-
ed.But as we shall see, the presence of a mechanism does not mean that it was correctly 
used or that its effects were desirable in the long run.  
2.1  Material and criticism of the sources  
In order to gain insight on the strategies and their effects, there was a need to collect 
information from a wide variety of places. Information on the initiatives has been ex-
tracted from extant data
10
 deriving from observations of the election process, reports of 
the major news media networks in the newspapers and in video coverage, policy docu-
ments as well as reports from the Uchaguzi platform for crowd sourced election moni-
toring. The texts and reports are treated as data to be interpreted and analyzed. Since 
they were created for other purposes, the contexts of its origins were taken in to consid-
eration.  
The work on the study was undertaken before, during and after the 2013 election. 
Over the weeks leading up to the election, during the voting process, announcement of 
the winner, and subsequent Supreme Court trial, there were significant opportunities for 
the collection of data of events and effects of the different strategies. 
Information from the various sources was then coded into Memos. In Grounded theo-
ry, coding means investigating the data to see what processes and phenomena can be 
seen through the data, and then using the codes to label the data. The codes are then 
written down into memos in narrative form. The memo writing is anessential middle-
step where the data is turned into pieces of material that can be compared.
11
 Comparing 
the data, allows new levels of codes to arise and be further categorized. When the pro-
cess is repeated the research results are generated.  
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11
 Ibid 2006, 72 
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3 Combining Human Rights with 
Accountability 
In the field of Human Rights, the concept of accountability is a core component, all 
though it is not mentioned in any of the main Human Rights treaties and convention 
documents, working towards accountability is a necessary condition for making the 
rights a reality. The reason is that accountability is a necessary condition for the dynam-
ics of the power relations between rulers and citizens so that the citizen is able to make 
a claim and have it implemented. 
Various rights-based approaches used for programming contributions for Human 
Rights, often present accountability as a main goal, but the specific meaning of the term 
in the Human Rights context is often missing. When the concept is commonly called 
forward as a universal solution to almost all problems without sufficient specification of 
what the concept means inside the Human Rights context, the term is robbed of the val-
ue that the concept can have in strengthening Human Rights.
12
 In order to make it a 
practical tool there is a need to specify what exactly is meant by the term. It should be 
understood what the semantic boundaries and the inner structures of the concept are as 
well as what it means in the specific situation, otherwise it is unclear what the recom-
mendation holds in terms of real action. 
 Without specification, the term refers to the broad and basic understanding of the 
core concept of accountability, which simply means the ability to hold someone to ac-
count.
13
A broad definition gives the term a wide variety of uses in many fields such as 
law, politics, personal ethics, accounting, business management etc. Each field has sev-
eral understandings and hold different meanings. Adding to the confusion, the term has 
a dualistic nature where it refers both to an abstract and clinically norm free phenomena, 
the way it is used in bookkeeping and accounting, and at the same time value-ridden 
                                                                                                                                               
 
12 Blind 2011, Goetz 2002, Schedler 1999, Lindberg 2009, Menochal 2013. 
13 Ackerman J. Social Accountability in the Public Sector: A Conceptual Discussion, Social Develop-
ment Papers No. 82, Washington DC: World Bank,2005, s11 
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because of being associated with the notions of responsibility, integrity, democracy, 
fairness and justice. 
14
 
Because of the variety of meanings in the different fields that use the concept and it 
is important that meanings are not mixed up for the concept to communicate any con-
tent of value. When the meanings and characteristics that each field gives the concept 
are mixed up, the result is that the possible benefits that can come from using accounta-
bility as a relevant tool for analysis and policymaking are no longer communicated. 
Taking to account that the discourse on Human Rights itself is a multidisciplinary field 
that uses a mix of law, ethics, theology and political philosophy, the mixing and bor-
rowing of theories gets even more complicated. Persons who have their background in 
each respective field might not reflect on the differences between the subtypes and as-
sume that the term holds the same meaning even in other disciplines. 
Basic Definitions 
Before exploring the concept further, it will be helpful to start with some more specific 
definitions.Lindberg claims that the current use of the term accountability has been con-
ceptually stretched through characteristics being added and subtracted so that hundreds 
of conceptual subtypes have emerged. It averts the potential benefits from using ac-
countability as a relevant tool for analysis and policymaking from being communicated. 
The various unclear understandings of the concept may lead to different interpretations 
and different results that are directly harmful for quality of research and analysis there-
by causing false conclusions and faulty decisions. Using classical concept formation, 
Lindberg suggests the following basic understanding of the core concept of accountabil-
ity: Accountability is a means to control power. It is not the only way to control power; 
others examples are for instance violence and financial sanctions. The quality that 
makes accountability special is that it is a relationship that restrains the decision-making 
of those who wield power over others. For something to count as accountability there 
are five key characteristics that must be present.
15
 
1. An agent or institution who is to give an account(Accountee) 
2. An area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability. (Domain) 
                                                                                                                                               
 
14 Blind K, Accountability in Public Service Delivery: A Multidisciplinary Review of the Concept 
2011, p. 2 
15 Lindberg, p. Accountability: Core concept and its subtypes, ODI Africa Power and Politics Pro-
gramme, Working Paper. 2009 p. 4 
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3. A person, group or institution to whom the first agent is to give account (Ac-
countor)  
4. The right and abilityof the Accountor to require A to inform and justify deci-
sions with regard to Domain; (Call to Accountability) 
5. The right of Accountor to sanction Accountee if the Accountee fails to inform 
or justify decisions with regard to the Domain. (Sanction)
16
 
According to Lindberg all five characteristics have to be present, otherwise we would be 
describing other phenomena. Different subtypes of accountability will all have these 
characteristics, but depending on how the roles are cast the dynamics become very dif-
ferent. For instance, a very simplified outline could show that in Legal Accountability 
the Accountor is the state, the Accountee is the citizen and the domain is the laws that 
the state has made, and they may not necessarily be just. The ways to call someone to 
account is highly specified and can only be done in pre-set ways with wide array of 
sanctions. In Democratic Accountability the persons who hold political power are the 
Accountees, held to account by the people, and the sanction is that they do not get re-
elected or through being publicly criticized and therefore loose influence.  
Assigning the role of the Accountee and Accountor can be done intentionally, by of-
ficial delegation of power, but sometimes they roles are simply facts of the power rela-
tions. 
Applying the Accountability outline on the Human right framework 
When combined with a Human Rights framework, there is a clear casting of the roles in 
the accountability dynamics.
17
The legal framework of Human Rights puts governments 
in the role of the Accountee because they are the ones who have the responsibility and 
duty to protect Human Rights and prevent violations. In the Human Rights discourse, 
this is the role of the Duty-bearer. 
18
.Many promoters of Human Rights argue that some-
times persons, media, companies or institutions are de facto wielding so much power 
that should be held to account for how they manage the power that is actually in their 
hands, but, if there is no right (Lindbergs fourth point) to hold them to account they 
                                                                                                                                               
 
16 Adapted from Lindberg, 2009, p. 8 
17 See Felix, 2012 for further reference 
18 This section borrows the concepts presented by Brian Orend in Human Rights Concept and Con-
text (2002) and combines it with the suggested outline. However, Orend does not combine the two 
frameworks.  
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cannot have the role of an Accountee.Given that the governments are the ones who have 
signed the human right treaties, they are the ones that can be held to account for the de-
livery of the right objects. However, the International Criminal Court has opened up for 
jurisdiction for individuals to be held to account for their role in severe violations of 
human rights. Inside their exceptional context, individuals are directly subject to human 
rights law. Elsewhere, citizens of ratifying countries are held accountable to obedience 
to the laws and policies that the governments create (which are supposed to be in keep-
ing with the human rights). 
The Accountor is equivalent with a Rights holder. In the Human Rights field, all hu-
man beings are considered Rights-holders.
19
At the same time, only citizens of countries 
have the actual abilities to claim accountability for their human rights because they are 
the only ones having corresponding Duty bearers for the delivery. Civil society organi-
zations, Ombudsmen or media can be the ones representing the citizens in making the 
actual claim.  
Domain that is subject to accountability translates to the right-object. The right object 
is the content of each specific right that the Accountor has the right to hold the Ac-
countee to account for securing. They must be specified and agreed on for there to be a 
right to require justification on its fulfillment and give out sanction.
20
 
The fourth point of this study’s adaptation of Lindbergs list is the right and ability to 
hold somebody to account. In the human rights framework,the right to hold somebody 
to account is seen as universal for all people, and it is assumed that the ability to do so 
should be there. Still, the mechanisms that will make this a reality are often missing, 
and a lot of the actual work that is done in the human rights field strives to build these 
mechanisms through capacity building, helping with monitoring, awareness-building 
initiatives etc. 
Calling to account is necessary because of the justification for sanction. Having a 
right means having a justified claim. 
21
 The claim to hold someone to account can only 
be justified if the Accountee has a chance to explain her actions or show that whether 
they hadactual influence over the situation. It has to be within his/her ability to coordi-
nate and allocate resources. Puppets or scapegoats who have acted according to the in-
                                                                                                                                               
 
19 Orend, 2002, s 15 
20 Ibid p. 29 
21 Ibid p. 2002, s 65 
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struction of somebody else or according to what has been agreed on are not legitimately 
objects of accountability.
22
 
Finally, the ability to sanction is central to the accountability dynamics. We give an 
account of our wrongdoing only when it is requested, and only when that request is 
backed up by power. If the right and ability to sanction is not there, the concept that is 
described is similar to having responsibility to someone. The difference is clear when 
we talk of Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR, where the Accountee has the option to 
provide information and justify their actions but they cannot be forced to present infor-
mation that they do not want to share and therefore cheating or misconduct is not ex-
posed.
23
 
Sanctions have to be powerful enough to change the incentive structure for the deci-
sion maker. The sanction can be a legal punishment, a financial fine or using name and 
shame destruction of a reputation and the sanctions must be strong to have any real ef-
fect on the conduct.
24
 
The issue of Superior Authority 
One should remember that accountability does not come automatically; its process de-
mands activities by the Accountor or their representatives. Richard Mulgan’s definition 
of accountability includes three central elements. First, he sets the condition that ac-
countability must be external, that the account is given to some other person or body 
outside the person or body being held accountable. For him, this is a necessary condi-
tion for the objectivity of information and efficiency of sanction. Secondly, he stresses 
the involvement of social interaction and exchange. The side that is calling for the ac-
count (Accountor) seeks answers and rectification while the other side, that is being 
held accountable (Accountee), responds and accepts the sanctions. Therefore, accounta-
bility structures have to be accompanied by mechanisms for monitoring that will pre-
vent eventual violations of rules from going unnoticed. The Accountor must also choose 
to use that information to claim the accountability and actually make the effort to do so.  
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Thirdly, it implies rights of authority, in that those calling for an account are asserting 
rights of superior authority over those who are accountable.
25
 
Mulgan’s third element introduces a crucial new component in our discussion, which 
is superior authority. If accountability necessarily implies power then we can only 
speak of accountability when the Accountor stands above the Accountee. Much of the 
challenge in achieving accountability lies here. The Accountor need to have more power 
than the Accountee to be able to extract information and in order to be able to back the 
claim with a sanction. Yet- it is exactly those who are disempowered that are the ones 
who are in need of holding others to account!  
Being unable to demand accountability is part of what it means to be poor and dis-
empowered. It’s an important reason why people remain stuck in poverty and disem-
powerment, because in the absence of accountability, it is likely that power is affected 
by corruption and capture. Capture can be understood as the process by which elites 
skim resources intended for legitimate ends and define policies in a way that protects 
their own interests.
26
 The ones who are misusing their power are the ones in position to 
block accountability claims and make them inaccessible for those who have less pow-
er.
27
 
No Accountability without Voice 
For this vicious catch 22 to be solved, increased “voice” and/or “empowerment” of the 
affected persons would be required. These terms are almost as vague as the term ac-
countability and are inconsistently used by different actors in politics or development, 
who differ in the rhetoric and what activities they ascribe to each term, in use and un-
derstanding. Comparing them in detail becomes complicated since each term is similar 
but carries its own intellectual baggage. Broadly defined, though, they include capacity-
strengthening activities for non-discrimination, inclusion and transparency. For in-
stance, Difid calls the balancing of accountability and increased capacity for the mar-
ginalized to make claims CV&A, Citizens Voice and Accountability. 
28
 Sida divides the 
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concepts further in the Human Rights based approach with its four pillars; Non-
discrimination, transparency, accountability and participation. 
29
 
Neither of these principles is sufficient on their own. Without accountability the calls 
for inclusion and increasing the voice and participation leads nowhere: if the powerful 
can choose not to listen, the powerless can scream as much as they want, no change will 
come. While voice and accountability are conceptually very different, they are nonethe-
less inseparable in practice. For there to be answerability, someone has to be asking the 
questions. To ask questions you must have voice, and you must have the insight and 
information to know what to ask. 
30
 
Building the ability of accountability 
When governments of the world commit to the protection of Human Rights, the com-
mitment implies construction of systems for securing the satisfaction of Human Rights. 
This means that violations must actively be prevented. This includes the development of 
adequate laws, policies, institutions, administrative procedures and practices, so that 
mechanisms will be there for the access of the entitlement. Under a rights-based ap-
proach, governments have a core obligation to monitor the realization of Human Rights 
and must put in place information and data collection systems. In this context, account-
ability will have both an intrinsic value in its own right but can as well be a tool for real-
izing all other Human Rights. 
31
 
Thus, building real capabilities for accountability will involve generating and spread-
ing information on the background for the decisions. It is important to build paths for 
those less empowered to have ways to claim their accountability. This can be done 
through institutional capacity building enterprises that create structures that make ac-
countability claims easier. Here is a very strong connection to the system of Human 
Rights.  
In the research field on accountability, the checks and balances between institutions 
within states is called horizontal accountability. There are normally very complex sys-
tems that put public officials under restraint and oversight. The oversight mechanisms 
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can be courts, ombudsman’s offices, auditing agencies, central banks and can call into 
question, and eventually punish, an official for improper conduct. A distinction is made 
with this type of equal level peer relationship and vertical forms of accountability, in 
which citizens and their associations play direct roles in holding the powerful to ac-
count. Elections are the often mentioned as classic form of vertical accountability (alt-
hough it is not always de facto the case because of mismanaged electoral systems). In 
the category of vertical accountability, there are also the processes through which citi-
zens organize themselves into associations capable of lobbying governments, demand-
ing explanations and threatening less formal sanctions like negative publicity. We can 
therefore say that vertical accountability is the state being held to account by non-state 
agents.
32
 
Horizontal and Vertical 
Putting focus on the reform of institutional structures will be necessary for claiming the 
rights to accountability. The laws must be in place for the domain of accountability to 
be clear and for the sanctions to be enforced. Nevertheless, over-reliance of horizontal 
accountability between state institutions as enforcer of accountability clashes when the 
state institutions are the ones who are supposed to be held account. When the law and 
institutional rule is both made and enforced only internally by and within the state, this 
can misdirect and handicap the real access to rights.
33
Consequently, there is a need to 
couple the internal accountability mechanisms with external mechanisms in order to 
avoid the very common trap where the only critique that is possible to follow up on and 
hold someone to account for, is focused on acting according to the correct procedures, 
rather than the effect of the actions. That is when procedures can be challenged and the 
structures of power and resource distribution can be improved. 
Laws are not always just. They can be challenged and changed through social mobi-
lization. Rights claims can provide better access to justice, that goes beyond the regula-
tions and law and become a force that mobilizes social forces
34
. Not all Human Rights 
are de facto accountability tools. They become accountability tools in the process of 
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claiming, mobilizing and struggle for the specific right. It is when the tools for account-
ability are at the hands of those who have a justified Human Rights claim that the rights 
that someone has in theory can become rights in practice.  
Social and Political 
The division between Social Accountability and Political Accountability clarifies the 
need for both legal, institutionalized accountability mechanisms as well as the ones 
driven, implemented and sanctioned by non-state actors of the civil society. While Polit-
ical accountability mechanisms are limited to specific and time bound formal proce-
dures, the social accountability methods are a continuous reflection of the demands of 
the citizens by street protests and demonstrations, public naming and shaming, petitions 
etc. The Social Accountability mechanisms provide opportunity for directly influencing 
government officials for more effective government action in the short run.Rather than 
imposing formal sanctions on politicians, they can impose a heavy reputational cost on 
government officials if they fail to answer to the citizens’ demands. The answerability 
that they can force from the public official does not last long unless it is formalized into 
procedural change and incorporated with the political accountability mechanisms. 
35
 
Both the political and social accountabilities can be part of relationships that go be-
yond the local or domestic issues. The Civil Society Organizations (CSO’s) and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) have the ability to mobilize support for account-
ability globally and have movements for issues that stretch into all the continents. Polit-
ically there are many dimensions of accountabilities for cooperation in the international 
relations. The fact that the CSO’s, NGO’s and multilateral organizations like World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the World bank and others wield power, should mean that 
they must be held accountable for how they use this power. Grant and Keohane argues 
for the recognition that all forms of power can be misused and that there is a need for 
building other paths for checking this power that are not necessarily democratic or pure 
like the ones that can regulate the citizen/state relationship. Perhaps the powers that 
come from voice should be checked by other voices. In addition, the powers held by for 
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instance the WTO should be by creating pathways inside the organization itself for the 
critique of its policies.
36
 
 In the development sector the concept of Mutual Accountability are highlighted as a 
priority of the Paris agenda. This concept divides accountability into domestic and mu-
tual. The aim for the development donors to help constructing stronger domestic ac-
countability by strengthening parliament, developing stronger CSO’s, while at the same 
time take responsibility for which incentives they create with their involvement. For 
instance, the donors may want to use direct financing of projects to avoid the threat of 
corruption in the domestic financial sectors. However, by doing so they could be un-
dermining and weakening the developing countries systems for Public financial man-
agement further.
37
 Another example is that the donors have pressure from their own 
citizens to provide results for the money given to other countries. While chasing such 
results the aid risks becoming short term and overly focused only on projects that are 
measureable quantifiably, or else the funding will be withdrawn. Such effects on incen-
tive structures can affect decision-making and weaken the capacity for accountability. 
For good or for evil? 
While accountability can be a tool to achieve social justice, it is important to remem-
ber that it is often used as a tool for the opposite. In the political reality in which ac-
countabilities exist, there is competition for resources and an ongoing struggle of which 
right claims should be prioritized. Under the banner of accountability, the powerful 
might implement misguided reforms that cause even more injustice. Being clear about 
the beneficiaries and goals of the accountability initiatives is important. Who is being 
held account, and for what? At times it can falsely seem clear who is Accountee and 
who is Accountor. Someone who is elected as a political representative will be sup-
posed to provide justification for their action to the public, because in principle, politi-
cians are answerable to citizens. In practice the politicians are often more immediately 
concerned with the sanctions wielded by corporate interests, such as the withdrawal of 
campaign finance or with dynamics within their political party, if the electoral system is 
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arranged in such a way that there is actually no real threat of sanction from the citi-
zens.
38
 
A Human Rights perspective gives a clear idea of roles in the accountability relation-
ship, especially from the “pro poor” perspective in its discourse. The state should be 
held to account for the benefit of each citizen in the domain of each specified right. The 
object is often the service delivery implied by each right. For instance, the right to edu-
cation implies training and hiring teachers for the schools, and the right to free and fair 
elections implies building a just electoral system. According to the New Accountability 
Agenda conceptualized by Goetz & Jenkins the accountability mechanisms should al-
ways be analyzed and approached with questions of by who, for what, when and where, 
to specify the directions internally in the accountability relationship. The above question 
of who should be the Accountee can result in normatively highlighting the need for 
more direct roles for ordinary people and their civil society organizations to demand 
accountability. The answer to the question “for what” is that they should be doing this 
on a more exacting standard of social justice. They should have an expanding repertoire 
of methods using horizontal, vertical, social and political accountability methods such 
as ombudsmen, anti-corruption boards, treaty monitoring councils etc. When necessary 
they should have the chance to bring their claim to a more diverse set of jurisdictions 
both locally and internationally.
39
 
Specifying the use of the concept can prevent the misuse of the accountability tool 
and protect it from the capture of the powerful. The tool can then be put it in the hands 
of those who need it to stop the oppression that they are living under in societies affect-
ed by inequality, corruption, capture, and poor service delivery. The threat of sanction 
will then switch hands from politicians using it to cement their power by punishing 
those who do not obey the unjustified laws and procedures created to solidify the op-
pression. The use of fear of sanctions such as state sponsored violence, imprisonment of 
activists and discriminatory laws can then be challenged by the change in incentive 
structure for the decision-making while creating the policies and procedures. With a 
genuine capacity for justified Human Rights accountability, the rulers will be the ones 
fearing the power of the people rather than the people fearing the power of the rulers.  
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4 Background onthe Case Study of 
Initiatives aiming to strengthen 
Accountability 
It is widely believed that the violence in the 2008 election was instigated by the power-
ful, but only affected the marginalized. The violence was ended through a Peace 
Agreement that was negotiated by an international team of mediators, resulted in a coa-
lition government where everyone who had taken part in the election was given part of 
the government. The ones who created the violence, from both sides, were rewarded 
when they should have been sanctioned. As they were made part of the governing bod-
ies that had the power to block petitions and initiatives for investigating, and trying the 
cases, impunity was almost total. The ability for the victims, and other people, to hold 
the leaders to account for their actions were almost completely absent. As a result, the 
decision of using violence to manipulate the outcome of an election is beneficial when 
they should have been detrimental. If this is the case, the willingness to make such a 
decision can be seen as part of the selection process of who actually rises to the top in 
the political hierarchy.  
Fearing that this would be a factor even for the following election, several initiatives 
were made to change the balance between rewards and sanctions in the decision to risk 
citizen’s security and rights to gain power. This was seen as necessary for the same sit-
uation not to repeat itself in the following election.Four such initiatives have been se-
lected for investigation with the aim of finding out how the initiatives relate to using 
accountability to strengthen human rights. 
4.1 Initiative of the International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court was created to have a complementary role to national 
courts when they are unable to prosecute offenders of the most severe crimes. It 
acknowledges that the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and gross human 
rights violations have historically remained unpunished. This can be because its perpe-
trators have too much influence and resources to be able to be genuinely prosecuted 
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intheir own countries or when the political situation that prevails after a country is af-
fected by this type of crime may be too sensitive for domestic trials. 
40
 
The team of international negotiators that were sent in to negotiate the peace agreement 
that ended the 2008 election violence ordered an investigative report called the CIPEV 
Report. The report contained some recommendations. Among these, the government 
was told to set up a special tribunal with Kenyan and International Judges to investigate 
and prosecute the persons who had financed and coordinated the Post-Election Vio-
lence. It was made clear that if the tribunal were not initiated in a certain period, the 
investigation with names, witnesses and other evidence would be handed over to the 
International Criminal Court, ICC.
41
 
Since the crimes are so severe that they can be classified as Crimes against Humani-
ty, they fall within the ICC jurisdiction if the individual state is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute. The right to circumnavigate the national sovereigntyis called proprio motu 
and is supported by Article 15§3 in the Rome Statute and gives the prosecutor of the 
ICC the right to start his own investigation even without the consent of the state. 
42 
When the Kenyan Parliament voted against the proposition that would create a local 
tribunal in February 2009 and then nothing else was done in the matter, the ICC prose-
cutorLuis Moreno Ocampo received the case in July of the next year. Ocampo consid-
ered the evidence so strong that he decided to use the proprio motu for the first time in 
the history of the Court. A case against six persons was opened and later confirmed. 
 Two of the suspects, William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta, are very influential politi-
cians from the opposite sides of the ethnic-political conflict that exists between the 
Kalenjin and the Kikuyu ethnic groups. Both Ruto and Kenyatta gained a lot from the 
power division of the 2007 election. Kenyatta became vice Premiere Minister as well as 
minister of finance and Ruto became minister of education. Despite, or perhaps because 
of, the ICC involvement, the two suspects eventually joined forces and campaigned for 
the presidency together. The pair eventually won the 2013 election. Kenyatta became 
president and Ruto became his Deputy. 
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ICC suspects are required by the Kenyan constitution to cooperate with the process, 
but it cannot prevent suspects from campaigning for presidency. Since the suspects 
should be seen as innocent until proven guilty, the trials were postponed until after the 
campaigns. After the election, Ruto has managed to postpone his trial, and Kenyatta has 
petitioned to do the same. Their new positions give them increased opportunity to avoid 
conviction, as witnesses are unlikely to testify against the president, several of the wit-
nesses dropping out citing safety concerns. 
43
As this is written in May 2013, the out-
come of the trials is still to be seen. However, it should be noted that the Kenyatta/Ruto 
election victory is an immense setback both for the ICC and for the struggle against 
impunity in Kenya.  
4.2 Constitutional Reform 
Perhaps the most significant change initiative that took place in Kenya between the two 
elections is that a new constitution was drafted and passed in a peaceful and well-run 
referendum in August 2010. It was the first time the constitution was changed since 
independence in 1963 and it provides for an extensive restructuring of the government 
and state. It gives hope to the potential end of the concentration of power on the presi-
dency, which is seen as strong contributing factor to the inequality between ethnic 
groups and the rivalry between them. The campaigns for the new constitution were led 
by Raila Odinga while Kenyatta led the campaign against it. 
The constitution makes room for several reforms that are intended to deal with the 
causes of the 2008 election violence. A new Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission (IEBC) was created to gain new public trust in the electoral body. They 
were to install biometric identification systems, which are devices that record finger-
prints when a person registers as a voter, which is meant to prevent casting false and 
multiple votes. A system for electronically counting votes was supposed to transmit 
results immediately over a secure network to avoid manipulating in the tallying of votes 
and enable the complicated tallying of votes. 
44
Manual counting would be very exten-
sive because of the introduction of voting for senator, governor and local assembly, six 
public officers per voter. New voting rules require the president to win more than half 
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the votes and have wider geographic support, or else a run-off election would follow 
automatically a few weeks later.
45
A judicial reform that includes the appointment of a 
respected new chief justice has taken place. This is very important because in 2008, the 
courts were appointed by the president and were loyal to him and therefore, it was im-
possible to dispute the electoral fraud and dispute in court. 
It would seem that with these changes, the country was well prepared for the elec-
tion; however, fundamental changes take time. What eventually played out in the elec-
tion of 2013 was very problematic.  
Voters shown strong commitment to peace and transparency, but several technical 
problems and manipulation of results occurred. A remarkable voter turnout of 86 % had 
many Kenyans standing in line to vote for as much as eight hours in the burning sun to 
cast their vote. There were delays because of malfunctioning biometric identification 
systems that led to IEBC ordering the use manual identification, despite the high risks 
of fraud and manipulation that could come from this. The electronic tallying of votes 
was supposed to be transparent and was therefore shown on screens in the IEBC and 
aired live on TV. Showing the tallying live meant that problems became apparent. They 
electronic transmission system was multiplying rejected ballots by a factor of eight, and 
so the IEBC stopped the electronic tallying and had to start counting the votes manually, 
a process that took five days. In the final tallying errors were evident, some constituen-
cies showed a more than a hundred percent voter turnout, and some 300 000 votes that 
could not be counted because of being “spoilt”.46 
Kenyatta had won, with 50.07 % of the votes. Odinga filed a petition to the Supreme 
Court, demanding a re-run of the election, saying that the technical problems enabled 
rigging and could not be credible. The campaign supporting the petition went under the 
banner “Democracy on Trial” and assured that they would respect the Courts verdict. 
The court decided to confirm Kenyatta as the winner. Consequently, Kenyatta will be 
responsible for implementing the constitution that he opposed, and make changes that 
will limit his own power.  
4.3 Ushahidi/ Uchaguzi  
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Monitoring to find out what is happening during an election is required to get the infor-
mation needed to give the election credibility and legitimacy, andto find out if some-
thing is going wrong. It has traditionally been the job of media, official election observ-
ers and police to obtain the information from the people trough surveys, interviews and 
for the police to monitor through collecting and following up on complaints reported to 
them. 
In the Kenyan setting, these methods have serious limitations. Infrastructural limita-
tions make it hard to reach many people in remote areas to survey, thus limiting the 
range of the information and the ability for people outside of the major cities to make 
their voice heard. It also takes long time to collect the information, which can result in 
that the momentum for the information to reach may be too late for it to be of value to 
the election process. 
47
 The Kenya Police has very low credibility because of being 
highly affected by corruption and inefficiency of bureaucracy and therefore does not 
seen as to give a real chance for someone to report what is going on and how they have 
been affected. 
48
 
Ensuring that there are pathways for people to inform others what has been done to 
them is indispensable for human rights accountability. For the poor and marginalized, 
this ability does not come naturally and they might representatives to speak out on their 
behalf, but these representatives need to receive information on what is going on.  
Some initiatives seek to fill this gap in monitoring. Ushahidi is the name of a 
crowdsourcing monitoring tool that allows anyone with a mobile telephone to report 
crimes that are committed on their location. The reports are then published in real-time 
on a webpage that pinpoints the report on a map. It uses a combination of citizen jour-
nalism, social activism and geospatial information towards increasing accountability 
with the aim to democratize access to tools for filtering and making sense of real-time 
information.
49
 
This type of initiative can make use of the rapid spread of mobile technology in Ken-
ya to provide people with an opportunity to let their experiences be known. Over the 
time period between the 2008 and 2013 elections, the increased use and spread of mo-
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bile phones has opened up a previously non-existent communications infrastructure and 
thereby contributing to giving new opportunity for Voice to the Kenyan people in re-
mote locations. 
Kenyan activists first developed the tool ad-hoc during the Post-Election Violence 
2008 when they built a platform to map incidents of violence occurring in the country. 
Since 2008, Ushahidi has grown from a volunteer initiative into a notfor-profit organi-
zation that builds tools for democratizing information and increasing transparency, and 
has been used in 159 countries. For the election in Kenya 2013, a platform was now 
developed and prepared in advance. It is called Uchaguzi, meaning election in Kiswahi-
li. During the election period, it contributed to spreading information on the unfolding 
events. It received and handled over 5000 reports on irregularities many of them indicat-
ing rigging of the election. 
4.4 Peace movement and Media self-censorship 
Unlike the initiatives that are explored above, the fourth initiative that will problema-
tized is not one coherent initiative by one agent or organization to achieve accountabil-
ity. It is rather a collective initiative of many organizations, newspapers and politicians 
that have in common that they intensely propagated abstaining from violence and from 
doing or saying things that might have led to violence erupting. 
Kenyan media has long had a reputation for being free and outspoken, true to their 
function as the monitoring watchdogs of democracy. 
50
This changed during and after 
the election violence in 2008.  Many of the respected media outlets, like KTN, Daily 
Nation and The Standard, seemed unaware of the consequences of spreading biased 
reporting and lending their airspace and pages to be platforms for politicians and mili-
tias to spread hatespeech. Showing killings by the police and airing political speeches 
live added to the tension even if the intention was to spread information of what was 
going on. However, at the outbreak of violence the Ministry of Information was asked 
by the Ministry of Internal Defence to shut down live broadcasting and news reporting 
and instead.
 51
 At the outbreak of violence, the media started to fill their pages with 
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peace messages and arrange peace rallies, while deliberately downplaying issues that 
would cause political anger to stir up.
52
 
After the 2008 crisis was over, the journalists and media houses were well aware of 
the impact their reports could have in triggering ethnic violence, and determined not to 
risk playing such a role again.  An agreement was made by Kenya's Media Owners As-
sociation that there would be no live coverage of announcements or press conferences 
by political parties, so that they would be able to avoid being an avenue for politicians 
to instigate violence and tensions.
 53
 The journalists underwent courses and training in 
media ethics and had clear intentions not to risk indirectly fueling other conflicts by 
making sensationalist reports about political issues that could be translated by the audi-
ence as ethnic issues.
 54
 
Foreign media did not have the same agenda, as they were naturally looking for sto-
ries that were newsworthy to their home audience. They were more interested in finding 
truth than to pretend as if it is normal to have two suspects of crimes against humanity 
on the ballot for presidency. The international journalists who were in Kenya to report 
on the election received a lot of criticism when they were asking uncomfortable ques-
tions. 
55
 
The anti-western mood created to discredit the ICC could also be noted in the suspi-
ciousness of the western media. It was said that the westerners were there to confirm 
their misconception that Africans are naturally prone to violence and that western media 
exaggerate African conflict while overlooking their own violence. 
What the Kenyan media was portraying was that the new institutions of the new con-
stitution should be trusted and obeyed, even if they were failing. People were asked to 
accept the way the cases were handled. Nothing other than following the process out-
lined in the constitution would be accepted in the media. This closed doors on the abil-
ity to question the obvious flaws of these institutions and the questionable handling of 
elections, and thereby holding the politicians to account for acting according to the will 
of the people. 
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5 Grounded theory analysis 
Good intentions- no results 
In the following section, the findings from the analysis of the four initiatives are ana-
lyzed, compared and investigated. One of the most significant similarities of the three 
first initiatives is that they all seemed very promising before the election. If they would 
work, they would contribute to major steps forward for the accountability mechanisms 
that they set out to improve. The cases in ICC could have contributed through ending 
impunity; the problematic reports given to Uchaguzi could have counted in the judg-
ment on whether the election was free and fair, and the transparency provided by the 
new electoral body IEBC provided for by the new constitution would make rigging im-
possible.  
Unfortunately, the existence of mechanisms are not enough, they also have to work 
efficiently to be a determining factor in creating accountability. As the outline in chapter 
shows the ICC was not able to prevent the suspects from gaining more power, and the 
tools for accountability that the IEBC was using failed one by one. The Uchaguzi initia-
tive did not fail in their work, they were able to handle thousands of reports of irregular-
ities in the election, however, in spite of the reports, the election was still considered 
free and fair, which indicates that there are missing contributing factors for the 
Uchaguzi initiative to be a real factor in Human Rights Accountability.  
In the Conceptual analysis in chapter 3, Human Rights Accountability was identified 
as a quality that may or may not be present in the relationship between rulers and citi-
zens. It marks the existence of restrains that anchor the behaviors of the decision makers 
so that the power of decision-making lies in the hand of the citizen. When this relation-
ship is present, the ruler is simply someone whom the people have delegated the deci-
sion-making to, on their behalf. The rulers will have the discretion to act as they think 
will be best for the people, but they are not at liberty to make decisions that does not 
have the people’s interest at heart.With this in mind, it is clear that the absence of vio-
lence should not be attributed increased Human Right Accountability for the politicians, 
as the restraints were not actually in place.  
Reversed accountability 
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While the peace campaigns probably had a very significant impact on the absence of 
violence, this is not a call for Human Rights Accountability, quite the reverse. It asks 
the people to be held to account for keeping the calm, when they should have been hold-
ing the leaders to account to make sure that there is no reason for protest. This dynamic 
takes away the possibility of the election to be an opportunity for reflection, renewal 
and to set out new directions. Pretending that nothing is wrong becomes a strategy to 
survive the elections, thereby taking away the chance that the people would have had to 
change the underlying tensions that are the root causes of the problems. If the vast ine-
qualities in resource distribution along ethnic lines are not addressed properly, it can 
spark violence at any time if there is a trigger for it.  
Levels of impunity from the last election have made rulers assume that they would 
be free to use violence as a method to gain political power. Legal accountability for the 
instigators of the 2008 violence has been swallowed by elite capture and other forces of 
impunity that are present in Kenya. Unfortunately, the international back-up mechanism 
for accountability for crimes against humanity also failed to install the assumption that 
crime does not pay. This is very evident by the fact that the ones considered in the in-
vestigations of the 2008 election violence, were able to win the following election. 
Failure of the ICC 
Failing to make a difference for Human Right Accountability can be traced to the ICC 
being unable to provide a sanction that is timely, backed with enough power and inter-
nally relevant.Due process in the ICC cases takes time. For correct Legal Accountability 
to be achieved the priority is on the legality of the process, not to reach a convicting 
sentence. Truth only matters if it can be proven with sufficient evidence and correct 
procedure. If witnesses take back their testimonies because of fear, their story can no 
longer be taken into account. Since Human RightsAccountability is only strengthened if 
the incentive structure is changed, it can only be affected if suspects are convicted in a 
correctly accomplished manner. An acquittal will instead contribute to the notion that 
there are no negative consequences for using violence to gain power.  Actual results of 
the process are vulnerable to the regulations of assuming innocence until proven guilty, 
and providing sufficient evidence. The regulations are necessary for the legitimacy of 
the court, but also mean that reaching a verdict in the Kenyatta and Ruto cases will be a 
challenging task. 
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ICC’s contribution to Accountability also through providing a name and shame sanc-
tion. Being identified as a suspect in their investigations should be a deterring factor, 
however, Ruto and Kenyatta used the ICC involvement to their advantage, citing the 
intrusion of sovereignty as being an expression of Western colonialism, only interfering 
in Africa. Given that half a century ago, Uhuru Kenyatta’s father, Jomo Kenyatta, led 
the country to independence from the British Colonial rule, this argument was very in-
triguing for the Kenyan voters. A name and shame sanction has to be from a trusted and 
credible source, relevant to the target audience, those whom are supposed to make the 
judgments on the person’s character. In this case, the external nature of the sanctioning 
body made it possible for those who were on the internal side of the issue to discredit 
the name and shame sanction until it simply did not matter to their disadvantage any-
more.  
The potential power behind the ICC sanction partly stems from a country’s unwill-
ingness to risk their position in international relations. This presumes that the sanction 
can only affect those who need favors from international relations. However, Kenya 
does not want to see themselves as to be in need of such favors. They are the strongest 
economy of the region. For western countries, Kenya is a necessary ally in relation to 
militant Islamist threats from neighboring countries. At the same time, they are being 
pursued by Asian investors that change the dependence on European and American aid 
and good will. Together, these factors undermine the ability to provide a sanction strong 
enough to be a factor in the incentive structure.  
Actions outside the sphere of influence  
The internal and external aspects of accountability are also reflected in the complica-
tions of how the reports from Uchaguzi can gain more importance. In trying to regulate 
how state institutions are behaving, civil society organizations are an external element. 
Collecting reports has avalue on its own because it contributes to giving a balanced pic-
ture of what events played out. The horizontal monitoring between the governmental 
agencies channels complaints and information formally and internally in the organiza-
tion, complicating the disclosure of sensitive information on irregularities and wrongdo-
ings by the institutions. Since they are part of the same organization, they will also be 
affected by sanctions if they are exposed. Information must therefore also be collected 
and distributed by external actors that are able to reach those who are able to put exter-
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nal pressure on the institutions to behave better and to follow up on what is wrong so 
that the institutions can change. 
On its own, the information cannot cause strengthened accountability, it has to be 
used by somebody who is actually claiming the accountability and calling to account the 
responsible parties. For this to happen there must be a recipient on the inside that is 
willing to formalize the answerability claim into procedural change and incorporate it 
with the political accountability mechanisms. The force of the mobilization needs to 
become part of an institutional system for it to bring an element of prevention into the 
Human Right Accountabilitydynamics.  The decision-making is only affected if it is 
assumed beforehand that transgression will be punished.  
Here the issue of sanction reemerges. Without backing upthe claim for accountability 
with the power and ability to sanction, it is unlikely that someone on the inside will 
think that it is a good decision to disclose incriminating information or to make changes 
that are not in the organizations interest. Therefore, the baton in the relay race must be 
handed over to an organization that is powerful enough to sanction. A small initiative 
like the Uchaguzi does not have this power. Nor do they have the mandate to follow up 
on the information, change policy, provide redress, and make arrests and so on. To cre-
ate a sanction of name and shame, media must spread the information. To create legal 
sanctions and the police must take over the cases. The role that Uchaguzi can play is to 
be a complimentary source of information that has the potential to reach others that do 
have the power and mandate to create accountability. 
Making the claim 
Opposition parties, NGOs and CSOs often take on the role to carry forward the ac-
countability claim by protesting, demonstrating and submitting petitions.Many CSOs 
petitioned for the election to be nullified because of the low credibility caused by failing 
transparency system and discrepancies in the tallying of votes. However, they were not 
able to put full force behind their claims because at the same time, these organizations 
wanted to support the new independent Supreme Court, and respect its ruling. The same 
organizations had been working hard for the constitutional changes to take place and 
they knew the importance of respecting the court would have for the implementation of 
the constitution as well as for avoidance of violence. Similarly, Odinga petitioned for a 
re-election, but as he was also the one who had developed and campaigned for the new 
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constitution, he was also swearing to respect the courts verdict regardless of the out-
come.  
Ability to mobilize a social movement to demand accountability was severely im-
paired by the presence of military and police in the places where demonstrations were 
likely to occur. In the name of security, the National Security Advisory Committee had 
restricted the freedom of assembly and association to be able to control the situation and 
avoid demonstrations turning violent. Accountability must be actively claimed to be an 
existing factor, and the demonstrations that occurred in Kisumu, Mombasa, outside the 
parliament and Supreme Court did not reach  enough strength to have an impact on the 
accountability claim. 
 
  32 
6 Concluding discussion  
While the conceptual analysis of the concept of Human Rights Accountability 
showed that it is a necessary condition for the realization of human rights, the grounded 
theory analysis of the Kenyan elections showed the complexity and the complications in 
achieving it. The existence of restraints that limit the behaviors of the ruler depends on 
the efficiency of the mechanisms that are in place to claim the accountability. Even 
when the best possible initiatives have been created, they mechanisms only add to ac-
countability when they actually become a restraining factor for the exercise of power. 
One of the obstacles for its attainment is that there is an important difference be-
tween working towards being able to claim the accountability and being able to achieve 
actual outcome of the human rights object.  Human Rights Accountability initiatives 
seek certain outcomes, but the successes of those outcomes are not the same as the suc-
cess of the accountability mechanism. The actual deliverance of right objects to the 
people can be determined by other factors such as availability of resources, infrastruc-
tural obstacles, and present inequalities in accessing the objects. These are arbitrary and 
do not guarantee that the deliverance of rights objects are going to continue to be deliv-
ered or to be delivered equally to all the rights holders. In order to secure the deliver-
ance of the rights objects it must be upon the government to live up to their responsibil-
ity to deliver those objects. 
Deliverance of the right objects may also be attributed to the people wanting to prior-
itize some Human Rights over others. The wide spectrum of rights that are included in 
the Human Rights framework sometimes comes into conflict and priorities have to be 
made. In Kenya the desire of the people, leaders, civil society and media to make sure 
that the rights of security and protection from violence would prevail, overshadowed the 
struggle to achieve free and fair elections. In the end, despite the efforts to create ac-
countability that took place between the elections, Human Rights Accountability was 
not a factor in the relationship between ruler and citizen.  
The absence of violence does not indicate that there was strong Human Right Ac-
countability. The absence of protest can instead be interpreted as a sign of a nation that 
is terrified of its own capacity for violence, and for the consequences that the protest 
  33 
would have for the nation, not for the ones instigating violence. Because of fear of what 
would happen if they held the politicians to account, the people and the media chose to 
downplay whatever wrong things went on in the election so that they would be accepted 
in the name of peace.  
The people’s fear of themselves gave the rulers a get-out-of-jail-free-card against act-
ing accountably in creating policy that can address these concerns and handicaps the 
influence on politics that the electorate ought to have. It is not enough that systems are 
in place to ensure that expression of dissatisfaction are under control through limiting 
freedom of assembly and through military presence in places where dissatisfaction  
would have been expressed.Violence should be avoided, but not at the price of oppress-
ing other rights such as right to victims redress, right to information and right to expres-
sion of free will.  
Using Human Rights Accountability as an analytical tool makes it possible to look 
beyond the absence of violence and see the flaws in how the election was handled. It 
also helps to point out that all the problems that caused the 2008 election violence are 
still there. The same people are in power despite investigations showing their culpability 
in the election violence, the tallying of votes done in just as questionable manner even 
when the reforms were made for them to be counted electronically with biometric iden-
tification, since this did not become a reality. The root causes of inequality in land 
rights, discrimination in resource distribution are not yet addressed.  
If there is an immediate assumption that the absence of violence in Kenya means that 
the mechanisms for accountability were functioning, this may lead to the false conclu-
sion that the causes of violence have been solved. The unsolved issues will then receive 
less attention and can linger under the surface and lead to worsening of the situations 
that cause the tension that can potentially lead to violence. 
Drawing a false conclusion that the work for reform is now finished will overshadow 
the need to continue the work that was started in those reforms. The new constitution is 
there, but not yet implemented, the prosecution in the ICC cases have not even started; 
the problems found in the Uchaguzi monitoring have not yet been addressed. The mobi-
lization of efforts to create accountability was motivated by the notion that there was a 
risk of re-occurring violence. If the risk is no longer perceived to be there, the strength 
of the mobilization may lose its force.   
On the contrary, it should be noted that mobilization for accountability has to in-
crease its efforts to be able to balance out the power of the rulers. As the conceptual 
  34 
analysis showed, accountability can only be claimed when the citizens have superior 
authority. For this to occur, the voice of the people must be coordinated to be strong 
enough to be heard.  In Kenya, Civil society action was not successful because of  being 
blocked by limitations in the freedom of assembly, controlling their ability to demon-
strate and express their discontent. The media self-censorship also contributed to limit-
ing the power to mobilize the public by choosing not to risk contributing to protests that 
could go wrong. 
However, achieving peace by omission brings legitimacy to the election despite the 
errors that were made. Recognizing the election as a success by not wanting to put up a 
fight to protect the people’s right to affect their governance allows for the building of a 
political system where someone can rise to power using violence, through mobilizing 
support from ethnic groups  and by promising advantages for the clientelistic relation-
ships. The system will favor the corrupt, which are willing to make personal profits out 
of the country’s resources and then use the profit to keep a firm grip on the power.  
The complexities and complications of achieving Human Rights Accountability 
shows that goals of achieving peace, democracy and justice can have competing agen-
das that complicate their mutual attainability. It is said  that justice and democracy are 
needed for peace, but struggling for justice and democracy can destroy the peace if the 
peace is only upheld  a superficially, covering up the problems allowing unjust and un-
democratic forces to thrive. In such a situation priorities have to be made. Sometimes 
temporarily choosing peace over justice and democracy may be the right choice. When 
that choice is made, it should be done with awareness of the sacrifice.  
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